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Abstract: This paper presents a monetary-theoretic model to study the implications of networks’ collection 
of personal identifying data and data security on each other’s incidence and costs of identity theft. To 
facilitate trade, agents join clubs (networks) that compile and secure data. Too much data collection and 
too little security arise in equilibrium with noncooperative networks compared with the efficient 
allocation. A number of potential remedies are analyzed: mandated limits on the amount of data collected, 
mandated security levels, reallocations of data-breach costs, and data sharing through a merger of the 
networks. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
More and more personal data is being collected as the cost of information technology 
falls.  While collecting such data undoubtedly provides economic benefits, it has proved 
impossible to keep data completely secure against criminal misuse. Survey data suggest that in 
2006 identity thieves obtained about $49.3 billion from U.S. consumer victims.  Add in the time 
and out-of-pocket costs incurred to resolve the crime, and identity theft cost the U.S. economy 
$61 billion in 2006.  Even this estimate, however, omits many contributors to the true economic 
cost.
1 
Dollar estimates of the cost of identity theft do not by themselves indicate that too much 
identity theft is occurring.  However, press accounts of data breaches suggest that personal 
identifying data (PID) is being stolen too frequently, and that the data thefts are unduly 
facilitating various kinds of identity theft.
2  This view is echoed in the legal literature on identity 
theft and data confidentiality.
3  There is also a general sense that “too much” PID is being 
collected, though some suggested policy fixes imply that more, not less, PID should be collected 
as a deterrent against its potential misuse. 
Economists (economic theorists in particular) have remained relatively quiet on issues 
                                                 
1 These estimates are derived in Schreft (2007).  It is difficult to gauge the extent and direction of identity theft from 
available data. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has conducted surveys of consumers to determine the 
incidence of identity theft.  A superficial reading of the FTC’s 2006 survey, released November 2007, suggests that 
rates of identity theft might have stabilized in the last few years, but the FTC acknowledges that methodological 
changes to the 2006 survey make the survey’s results noncomparable to those from earlier surveys, thus preventing 
the survey from being used to identify trends in the incidence of identity theft (Synovate, 2007).  Javelin Strategy 
and Research conducted the survey in years when the FTC did not and in 2006, and made the same methodological 
changes in its 2006 survey as did the FTC.  Hence Javelin’s 2006 results are also noncomparable to its earlier survey 
results.   
   Regardless of methodology, the FTC and Javelin surveys, as well as any other surveys of consumers, at best yield 
estimates of acts of identity theft known to consumers.  Acts of identity theft not known to consumers obviously 
cannot be captured by surveys of consumers.  (Schreft 2007, footnotes 13-15) 
2 Recent examples include “To Fight Identity Theft, A Call for Banks to Disclose All Incidents,” New York Times, 
March 21, 2007; “Who’s guarding your data in the Cybervault? ChoicePoint redeemed itself but not all brokers as 
careful,” USA Today, April 2, 2007; “Securing Very Important Data: Your Own,” New York Times, October 7, 2007; 
“Data Breaches Surpass 2007 Level, But businesses Rarely Are Penalized,” Wall Street Journal September 9, 2008. 
3 See e.g., LoPucki (2001, 2003), Solove (2003, 2004), Swire (2003), and Chandler (2007). 2 
regarding identity theft and data breaches.
4  Swire (2003) attributes this lack of interest to the 
commonly held belief among economists that information revelation generally promotes 
efficiency, leading economists to systematically overemphasize the costs and underestimate the 
benefits of data security.  Reliance on economic theory can therefore lead to a serious 
underestimation of the efficient degree of data confidentiality, according to Swire. 
Swire’s argument is a challenge to economists to develop more precise notions of what 
constitutes an efficient level of PID accumulation and security.  This paper is one response to 
this challenge.  The formal model presented below uses contemporary monetary theory to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of amassing and securing PID as key elements of a credit-based 
transactions arrangement.  This framework allows exploration of what is gained and lost through 
the accumulation, sharing, and theft of PID. 
The application of monetary theory is fundamental to this task, as it explicitly delineates 
two key market frictions that might be counteracted through the use of PID:  (1) displacement of 
agents’ consumption demands over time, and (2) a limited ability to force agents to repay debts.  
The economic benefit of a credit-based payment system derives from its ability to counteract 
these frictions, and sufficient knowledge of agents’ identities is indispensable to the provision of 
this benefit—credit is impossible without knowing who the debtor is. 
The environment in this paper extends the model of identity theft developed in Kahn and 
Roberds (2008) to incorporate the possibility of identity theft through data breaches.  The paper 
begins by presenting a game-theoretic model of multiple credit-card networks.  Card networks 
are modeled as club arrangements for the sharing of essential information for intertemporal 
trade:  sufficient knowledge of agents’ identities and credit histories.  Each club must decide how 
much data on its members to assemble into a database, and each also must choose how 
                                                 
4 Some relevant literature is discussed in Section 5 below. 3 
thoroughly to secure its database.  Collecting more PID imposes costs on card-network 
participants, but yields a benefit in terms of identifying the most casual, opportunistic, and 
simplistic attempts at fraudulent access to the network.  On the other hand, collecting such data 
can have negative spillover effects, because one network’s data can be stolen and used to open 
an account with another network.  A network can deter data theft (and therefore suppress identity 
fraud) by better securing its database, but it might be cheaper to suppress fraud by increasing the 
amount of PID compiled. 
The paper proceeds to compare the networks’ data and security decisions to the decisions 
that a planner would implement.  Under mild technical conditions, this analysis confirms the 
popular wisdom concerning data breaches:  in equilibrium, too much PID is collected, and the 
data is insufficiently secured.  The paper then considers a number of regulatory remedies for this 
inefficiency. 
The model environment is initially developed for networks of fixed size.  A later section 
extends the analysis to networks of variable size.  Merging networks internalizes the benefits of 
fraud deterrence and can reduce the scope for identity theft.  For sufficiently heterogeneous 
preferences, however, it is shown that agents may prefer to separate into multiple networks, even 
when this facilitates identity theft through data breaches.  This analysis, while exploratory, 
illustrates bounds on efficiency gains achievable from consolidation of PID. 
In summary, the approach here allows for explicit calculation of the efficient levels of 
data accumulation and data security, and for straightforward evaluation of policies meant to 
attain efficiency.  More generally, it offers an illustration of how any such calculation should 
balance the costs associated with data misuse against the substantial gains afforded by the 
relaxation of anonymity.  4 
 
2.  Institutional Background 
  This section provides a brief overview of the phenomenon of identity theft and its 
relationship to data security.  More extensive surveys are given in Schreft (2007) and Anderson 
et al. (2008). 
  It is constructive to begin by defining terms.  Identity theft can take many forms in 
practice and need not involve data breaches.  The Federal Trade Commission (2007) divides 
identity theft into two broad categories:  existing-account fraud and new-account fraud.  Existing 
account fraud occurs when a thief steals an existing payment card or similar account information 
(e.g., a checking account number) and uses these to purchase goods and services.  Traditionally, 
new account fraud occurs when a thief uses someone else’s PID to open a new account.  An 
increasingly prevalent type of identity fraud is fictitious or synthetic identity fraud, in which a 
thief combines information taken from a variety of sources with invented information to create a 
new, fictitious identity (Schreft 2007).  Synthetic identity theft is actually a type of new account 
fraud, with the new account being in the name of a real or fictitious person.
5  By one recent 
estimate, more than 80 percent of all new-account identity theft has occurred using synthetic 
identities (Coggeshall 2007).  As will be clear below, new-account fraud is the type of identity 
fraud that occurs in the model.   
  Data breaches can facilitate either existing-account fraud (as when credit-card 
                                                 
5 It has been noted that the payment-card industry uses some additional terminology in discussing identity theft.  
Cheney (2005) distinguishes payment-card fraud, which refers to the theft of information about an existing payment 
card and use of the information to make fraudulent card purchases, and account-takeover fraud, where the identity 
thief changes the address on an existing financial account, which allows the thief to more fully control the account 
and to deter capture longer.  Both payment-card fraud and account-takeover fraud are cases of existing account 
fraud under the FTC definition.   5 
information is stolen) or new-account fraud (as when PID is stolen).
6  There is no definitive 
estimate of how many cases of identity theft have resulted from data breaches.  Certainly, data 
breaches are numerous and increasing:  although no comprehensive surveys are available, the 
information-security website Attrition.org lists 326 reported data breach “incidents” for 2007, 
leading to the compromise of 162 million records of personal data, as compared to 11 reported 
incidents and 6 million compromised records in 2003.  These figures are likely underestimates as 
many breaches are not reported. 
Of course, a data breach is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for identity theft.  
Data can be stolen without being used for fraudulent purposes.
7  Nevertheless, there seems to be 
widespread recognition that data breaches can promote identity theft, particularly in its more 
costly and pernicious forms.
8 
The costs of identity theft must be weighed against the benefits provided by the 
availability of PID, which lie at the heart of modern credit-based systems of exchange.  There are 
no direct estimates of these benefits, but the sheer volume and increasing popularity of services 
such as card-based payments indicates that these are substantial.  In 2005 in the U.S. alone there 
were 43 billion card transactions worth $2.6 trillion (Bank for International Settlements (2007)). 
 
3.  The Model 
3.1 Modeling choices 
As discussed in the Introduction, the central policy issue concerning identity theft is 
                                                 
6 Actually, because many credit-card issuers will open accounts for people who present an existing credit card, a 
data breach involving the theft of credit-card information also contributes to new-account fraud.   
7 For example, the Javelin 2008 Identity Fraud Survey Report finds that 7 percent of consumers surveyed who knew 
how their identifying information was stolen reported a data breach as the culprit (Javelin 2008).  However, year 
after year, a large majority of consumers surveyed by Javelin do not know how their identifying information was 
stolen. 
8 Such data breaches include the 2005 breach at TJX Companies, with an estimated total cost in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars (Schreft 2007). 6 
whether, under current arrangements, PID is being efficiently collected and secured.
9  There are 
two obstacles to analyzing this issue.  The first is that with modern information technology, 
knowledge of PID and control of access to it has been effectively transformed into a type of 
nonrival good, whose efficient allocation is bound to be less straightforward than that of 
standard, rival goods (Varian 1998, 2004).  The second is that in the marketplace, these nonrival 
goods are provided through the interaction of many disparate parties (e.g., consumers, 
merchants, credit bureaus and other information brokers, credit-card issuers, financial 
intermediaries, and firms that provide transaction processing and information-security services) 
whose actions are subject to complex laws, regulations, and contractual obligations. 
To shed some light on the relevant policy questions, the analysis below abstracts from the 
second difficulty to concentrate on the first.  That is, in the model environment, PID is 
accumulated and shared through simple club arrangements.  By forming and dividing across 
multiple clubs, agents can facilitate exchange in the presence of uncertainty about agents’ 
identities.  For concreteness, a club is referred to as a “credit-card network,” and there is 
sufficient homogeneity so that each club qua network can be sustained through straightforward 
agreements among club members.  Collecting and maintaining a database of personal 
information provides benefits to club members by assuring that debts will be repaid and deterring 
frauds.  However, if a club’s database is not adequately secured, it also can facilitate identity 
theft. 
The model environment does not incorporate existing account fraud.  This is done to 
maintain tractability and concentrate on the more costly varieties of identity theft, i.e., new 
                                                 
9 As noted in Anderson et al. (2008) there are many open questions about the properties of efficient allocations. 
Should there be limits on how much PID can be compiled and shared?  Is there a “market failure”?  Should criminal 
penalties for identity theft be increased?  These questions, however, cannot be meaningfully addressed without some 
underlying notion of efficiency. 
 7 
account and synthetic identity theft.  Existing account fraud is actually quite similar to 
counterfeiting, which already has been formally modeled and analyzed in the money literature 
(discussed in Section 5 below). 
The basic building block of the model is a simple model of payments, adapted from 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) (see Kahn and Roberds (forthcoming) for application of a similar 
model to various payments environments).  A distinctive feature of the model is that it 
“accelerates” the matching of buyers and sellers, so that every possible variety of match occurs 
within a finite period of time.  This matching is also cast in continuous time, which allows for 
continuous variation over the size of the card networks.  These features, while not essential, 
allow for analytical characterization of economies with identity theft. 
 
3.2 Basic environmental features 
The economy exists in continuous time and consists of a continuum of risk-neutral 
agents.  Associated with each agent is a unique fixed vector known as the agent’s identity.  The 
dimension of this vector is sufficiently high as to be effectively infinite.  An agent’s identity is 
private information and never automatically revealed.  Each agent is congenitally either a 
legitimate agent or a fraud (i.e., an identity thief).
10  F denotes the fraction of frauds in the 
population.  The next subsection describes frauds in more detail, while this subsection further 
describes legitimate agents. 
A positive measure of legitimate agents is of type α , where α  denotes the agents’ 
production types, meaning the consumption good the agents can produce.  It is convenient to 
think of an agent’s type as his “location,” although the model does not rely on geography.  Also, 
                                                 
10 As modeled here, only certain agents have the option to engage in identity theft.  The environment studied can be 
generalized to allow for endogeneity along this margin (see Kahn and Roberds (2008)). 8 
the production types fall into two distinct groups,  A G  and  B G , where  AB GG ∩ =∅.  The 
measure of group  A G  ( B G ) is given by  A µ  ( B µ ).  In this section,  1 AB µ µ = = . 
Within each group, production types are distributed uniformly over the unit interval.  
Agents within each group wish to consume the goods of all other agents of the same group.  
Time begins at date  0 t = .  During the initial interval  [0,1) t∈ , nondurable goods of type y, 
[0,1) y∈ , are available for purchase and consumption at time y, when each type-y agent can 
supply up to a unit measure of good y.  Intuitively, potential consumers of type  yy ′ ≠  “journey” 
to location y to purchase and consume good y.  This process is repeated during subsequent unit 
intervals; i.e., at any time  0 t ≥ , goods of type      () yt t t ≡−  are available for purchase and 
consumption, where     t  denotes the largest whole number less than or equal to t. 
Over all times  0 t ≥ , production within group i imposes an instantaneous disutility of 
() () ( ) i cy y ty d t θδ −  on type-y agents, where  0 i c > , ( ) i y θ  denotes the measure of goods 
produced by type-y agents, and δ is Dirac’s delta function.   ( ) i y θ  will be determined in 
equilibrium as described below.  For type- y′agents of group i, where  [0,1) y′ ∈  and  yy ′ ≠ , time 
t consumption of one unit of a type-y good yields instantaneous utility  i ud t , where  0 ii uc >> .  
At each time t, potential consumers of type  ( ) yy t ′ ≠  are randomly matched with one (and only 
one) producer within the same group of type  ( ) yt , with i.i.d. matching over time, so that all 
transactions are between agents without any previous contact. 
Both groups of agents consist of stochastically lived overlapping generations.  At each 
discrete date  0,1,2, n = …, a randomly selected subset of types dies and is replaced by newborn 
agents of the same type.  The measure of deaths and births is given by 1 β − , where 0 1 β << .  9 
The deaths of agents and the identities of the dead immediately become public information, so 
only the living are potential victims of identity theft. 
By construction, barter cannot occur in this economy, and money does not exist.  
Exchange thus depends on the existence of some sort of credit arrangement, and therefore on 
sufficient knowledge of agents’ credit histories (Kocherlakota 1998).
11  A difficulty in 
constructing such histories is private information:  in addition to an agent’s identity, an agent’s 
group and type are private information ex ante.  Without some arrangement to overcome these 
frictions, no one would have an incentive to supply a good, and trade would not occur.  
To enable trade to occur in some circumstances, a central authority (or “court”) exists 
with three limited and specific powers.  First, the central authority can observe an agent’s actions 
as a producer (i.e., whether an agent has supplied a unit measure of goods during a time interval 
[0,1), [1,2), … ).  Second, at discrete dates  0,1,2, n = …, the court can publicly announce the 
observed action.
12  Third, the court can, when making this announcement, impose a 
nonpecuniary penalty of X > 0 utils on an agent who has refused to supply a good, provided that 
the agent can be identified. 
 
3.3  Benchmark:  exchange without identity theft 
As a benchmark, this subsection considers the case where there are no frauds (F = 0) and 
thus no identity theft. 
An agent’s actions as a consumer (purchases of goods away from the agent’s “home 
                                                 
11 At the cost of considerable added complexity, the model could be modified to allow agents the option of 
transacting with cash as well as by credit.  This generalization is explored in, for example, Martin, Orlando, and 
Skeie (2008) and Monnet and Roberds (forthcoming).  Here it might be useful to think of agents’ utility from 
consumption, u, as their “credit benefit,” i.e., the utility from additional consumption (or convenience) beyond that 
which would be available if cash were the only means of transacting.  The analysis below implicitly assumes that 
this credit benefit outweighs the privacy advantages of using cash (see Kahn et al. (2005)). 
12 In practice, such announcements (or close approximations thereto) are provided by credit bureaus. 10 
location”) are not observable by the center.  Exchange will require some arrangement for 
associating the identities of would-be buyers with histories.  These arrangements are modeled as 
clubs for sharing information on buyers’ identities.
13  The analysis will initially consider the case 
where one club exists for each group of agents.  Each club i, , AB iGG = , is formed at time  0 t = .  
An agent joining the club agrees to reveal a subset of his identity, sufficient to distinguish him 
from all other agents.
14  Having revealed part of his identity, the agent receives an 
uncounterfeitable credit card that signals his membership in the club. The card can be costlessly 
authenticated by all club members. 
By joining club i, an agent also reveals his group, though not his type.  Club membership 
entitles the agent to a (flow) unit of a consumption good from any other club member in return 
for agreeing to provide a quantity  ( ) i y θ  of his own type of good to other club members, at some 
point during each unit interval of time.   ( ) i y θ  is determined as follows.  Let  ( ) i y γ  be the 
measure of agents of type- y agents who participate in club i and let  i γ  be the measure of club- i 
members of all types.  Then 
 
max ,1 , if ( ) 0,
() ()













>   =  
 = 
 (1) 
At subsequent discrete dates  1,2, n = …, the center publicly announces the default of any club 
members who have not supplied goods and imposes penalty X on them, and they are excluded 
from the club.  Membership in each club subsequently is opened to newborn agents.
15 
                                                 
13 As in Boyd and Prescott (1987), membership in the clubs will vary over time even as the clubs persist. 
14 Legitimate agents have no talent for obtaining goods through fraudulent activity.  For the purposes of this 
introductory section only, it is assumed that data on legitimate agents can be assembled at a negligible cost. 
15 In a more general setup, the club would need to keep track of each agent’s detailed consumption history as well.  
In the structure considered here, these histories would be essentially identical (differing only in the instants when 
goods are supplied), so that an agent’s history is automatically revealed through his decision to supply goods.  11 
Suppose that all agents of group i and type  yy ′ ≠  decide to join club i.  For an agent of 
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for  0,1,2, n = ….  If all agents of group i join club i,
16 then the date n discounted present value of 
club membership is 
  ,, 1 in i i in Vu cV β + = −+ . (3) 











1 1 r β
− =− .  Ongoing membership in the club requires that a type-y agent be willing to 
supply a unit measure of goods at time ny + .  Absent nonpecuniary penalties, this requires that 
the disutility of producing goods be less than the value of continued club membership, i.e., 
  ii cV β ≤ , (5) 
or equivalently that  ii uc β ≥ .  If a nonpecuniary penalty X is available, condition (5) becomes 
  ii cX V β − ≤ , (6) 
which implies that the club can always sustain the efficient allocation, in which everyone trades, 
for X sufficiently large.  The analysis below will assume that condition (6) holds, so that all 
difficulties in organizing exchange stem from the presence of fraud. 
 
                                                 
16 Legitimate agents are restricted to symmetric pure strategies. 12 
3.4  Fraud and frauds 
  In general, a subset of the agents within each group at each date are frauds.  Frauds 
resemble legitimate agents, except in the detail that they are unable (or for unknown reasons 
unwilling) to supply goods to other agents.  However, frauds still enjoy consuming the goods 
produced by others.  Thus, they cannot gain legitimate access to their preferred club without 
incurring penalties and subsequent exclusion.  As a result, they have an incentive to obtain 
consumption goods by posing as legitimate agents.  Within each group, frauds are not distributed 
uniformly over production types but are instead confined to a measurable set of known 
“locations,” where the measure of this set is given by  0 F > .  No legitimate agents are found at 
these locations. 
The presence of frauds potentially reduces the value of club membership.  In particular, if 
all legitimate agents in group i join club i, and all frauds in group i are able to pose as legitimate 
agents, then the value of legitimate membership becomes 
  ()
1




+  =− − 

, (7) 
which is negative for F sufficiently close to one (note in particular that  ( ) 1 i y θ =  continues to 
hold at all non-fraudulent locations).  A sufficiently high rate of fraud undermines legitimate 
agents’ incentives to participate in a club, which can preclude trade.  Legitimate club members 
thus will have an incentive to exclude frauds. 
 
3.5  Identification of agents 
To distinguish legitimate agents from frauds, agents must be reliably identified.  Clubs 
accomplish identification by collecting a subset of each agent’s identity.  For this model, the 
amount of identifying information disclosed, not the type of information, matters.  Hence, the 13 
information disclosed is represented by  , in d , referring to the number of elements an agent must 
disclose from his identity vector to be identified by club i at discrete dates n.  For analytical 
convenience  , in d  is taken to be a continuous variable, i.e.,  , in d + ∈  .  Each club compiles and 
maintains a database containing the identifying information disclosed by its members.  The cost 
to the two clubs of merging their databases is assumed to be prohibitive.  (This assumption is 
relaxed in a subsequent section.) 
  Identification of agents is costly, and there are two components to the cost.  The first 
component is a fixed one-time cost of  i K  utils, which is incurred when an agent initially joins 
club i and is borne pro-rata by all legitimate club members.  The second component is a per-
discrete-period, per-member cost of processing and maintaining the data record  , in d  for each club 
member.  This cost is given by  , ii n kd , where  0 i k >  and is also borne by all legitimate club i 
members.  Note that the parameters  i K  and  i k  reflect physical costs but perhaps also intangible 
costs associated with the loss of privacy stemming from identity verification.  Also note that  , in d  
can vary across discrete periods.  That is, a club can vary the amount of identifying data it 
requires from its members from one period to another.  Once a club has collected data at discrete 
dates  0,1,... n = , the data must be maintained until date  1 n+  if the club is to avoid paying the 
initial identity verification cost K on all members at time  1 n+ .
17 
 
3.6  Identity theft 
Following the initial verification of an agent’s identity, the agent receives an 
                                                 
17 In other words, data compiled at discrete date n and not needed at n+1 can be costlessly and securely disposed of 
at n+1, but must be held over the interval [n, n+1] to avoid incurring the fixed cost K.  A more general setup could 
incorporate a flexible cost function for secure data disposal. 14 
uncounterfeitable credit card.  Credit cards are issued at zero additional cost.  Because credit 
cards are uncounterfeitable, identity theft in the model does not involve the cloning of existing 
cards or use of existing card numbers:  there is no existing account fraud.  Rather, all identity 
theft involves the opening of a new credit-card account in the name of an apparently legitimate 
agent. 
Credit cards issued at discrete dates n have a virtual expiration date of  1 n+ .  That is, at 
discrete date  0 n > , each club receives from the center a list of agents who have supplied goods 
during the preceding interval [1 , ) nn − .  Members who have not supplied goods are revealed as 
frauds, penalized if their identities are known, and removed from the club, while those who have 
supplied goods continue their membership.
18  Apart from exclusion from the club, no penalties 
can be applied to impersonators because their real identities are unknown.   
Discovery of an impersonator in club i imposes a fixed resolution cost of L, which is 
borne equally by all legitimate members of club i.
19  L can include various kinds of costs, 
including physical costs, loss of leisure time, inconvenience, and simply loss of privacy.
20  Note 
that this cost is in addition to the fraud loss, c, incurred when a fraud illicitly obtains a good.  
To gain access to a club, frauds must convincingly impersonate a legitimate agent.  A 
fraud has two means of obtaining the necessary data:  he can steal (i.e., observe) at least some of 
the data needed for the impersonation, or simply manufacture sufficient data to construct a 
                                                 
18 One can conceive of other arrangements for trade within the club.  For example, each producer could verify each 
buyer’s identity independently, but this would require that each buyer’s verification cost be incurred infinitely often.  
Or, the club could verify members’ identities at the beginning of each discrete period, issue “no-name” credit cards 
valid for only one period, and dispose of all identifying information on its members.  In what follows it is assumed 
that the value of the initial verification cost K is sufficiently high relative to other costs in the model that the use of 
anonymous credit cards is not an attractive option. 
19 Because all legitimate club members are risk neutral and have the same preferences, there is no loss of generality 
in assuming these costs are equally distributed. 
20 For example, according to Douglas (2008), it costs a card issuer about $25 to reactivate a compromised credit card 
account.  Other, less readily quantifiable costs of resolving identity fraud are catalogued by Anderson et al. (2008), 
and include the time cost of resolution, harassment of victims by debt collectors, denial of utility service, and being 
subject to misplaced civil lawsuits and criminal investigations. 15 
convincing identity.  Because the submission of duplicate PID of an existing club member would 
be automatically revealed as fraudulent (i.e., there is no existing-account fraud in the model), 
data observed in a breach of club j’s database is always used to gain access to club i.   
The amount of data lost through a data breach depends on how well the target club 
secures its database.  Suppose that club i decides to maintain member data  ,1 in d −  over the interval 
[1 , ) tn n ∈− , where  1 n > .  The club then chooses a variable  ,1 0 in s − ≥  that determines, for the 
next discrete date n, the likelihood of a data breach, given the technical skills of the would-be 
data thief. 
More specifically, the variable  ,1 in s −  is the technical skill threshold required to access club 
i’s database at discrete date tn = .  The distribution of technical skills s within the population of 
frauds is time invariant, and is given by the probability distribution function  ( ) s Φ , where 
() 1 s Φ<  for s <∞.  Intuitively, by setting a higher skill threshold, the club can lower the 
proportion of the population of frauds that can potentially gain access to the club’s database.  
Increasing the skill required for database breaches brings with it increased costs, however.  In 
particular, adopting skill threshold  ,1 in s −  results in a cost to all legitimate members of club i of 
disutility  ,1 in s −    incurred at discrete date  1 n− , where  0 >   .  Thus, the possibility of a breach is 
never completely eliminated. 
Frauds lacking the technical skills for data theft can attempt to obtain the necessary data 
for impersonation through other means.  Compiling the data  , in d  necessary for entry into club i at 
discrete date n involves a utility cost  , in d ε , where  0 ε > .  As with the technical skills, the “fraud 
effort cost” ε is assumed to have a time-invariant distribution  () ε Γ  over the population of 16 
frauds, where Γ is independent of the skill distribution Φ.
21 
Frauds who possess sufficient skill may reduce their effort costs by stealing data.  If a 
fraud of group i breaches club j’s date  1 n−  database, and obtains data  ,1 jn d − , then a proportion η 
of this data can be applied to gain membership to club i.  In this case, the net amount of data the 
fraud must synthesize to gain access to club i is 
  { } ,, 1 max ,0 in jn dd η − − , (8) 
and his net effort cost is given by
22 
  { } ,, 1 max ,0 in jn dd εη − − . (9) 
To summarize, the prevalence and type of identity fraud committed in club i during 
[, 1 ) nn+  depends on three factors:  (1) the amount of data  , in d  needed to gain access to club i at 
discrete date n, (2) the skill threshold  ,1 jn s − specified by club j at discrete date  1 n− , and (3) the 
amount of club j’s data obtainable through a breach at date n,  ,1 jn d η − . 
  When a club’s data is stolen and used to gain fraudulent access to the other club, the 
members of the first club are subject to a “breach cost”  0 B >  borne equally by all members.  As 
with the resolution cost L, B can include physical, time, and intangible costs.  In the well-known 
case of the TJX breach, for example, such costs included costs of fraud investigation, litigation, 
and loss of reputation for data security.
23 
 
                                                 
21 Unskilled fraud might arise through a combination of data synthesis and opportunistic behavior. 
22 Here, skilled identity fraud always involves theft of data through a data breach, which is then (in general) 
combined with data obtained through other means (synthesis or opportunistic behavior) to construct a false identity. 
23 There are other ways of modeling costs associated with data breaches.  What is central to the analysis below is 
that each club’s accumulation of PID generates social costs that may not be fully internalized by the club. 17 
3.7  Symmetric steady-state equilibrium 
Suppose that at discrete date  1 tn = − , club j decides to maintain data  ,1 jn d −  on its 
members and specifies a skill threshold  ,1 jn s − .  For an unskilled fraud (one unable to attempt a 
data breach) from group i, the payoff to committing identity theft at tn =  and gaining access to 
club i over [ , 1) tn n ∈+  is given by 
  , (1 ) ii n uFd ε − − . (10) 

















For a skilled fraud of group i, the payoff from fraud over  [, 1 ) tn n ∈ +  is given by 
  { } ,, 1 (1 ) max ,0 ii n j n uF d d εη − −− − . (12) 
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If preferences are symmetric across clubs ( AB uuu = = ; AB ccc = = ;  AB KKK = = ;  AB kkk == ), 
then in steady-state equilibrium it must be the case that  ,, 1 0 in jn dd η − − > .  Hence, for the 
symmetric case, the measure of skilled frauds who gain access to club i at discrete date n can be 
stated as 
  () ,1
,, 1
(1 )








−Φ Γ  − 
 (14) 18 
 Each  club  i chooses a data record length  , in d  and a skill threshold  , in s  for each discrete 
date n so as to maximize the discounted future utility of its club members, taking into account the 
choices of the other club.
24  Club i’s date-n objective (the continuation value of club 
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where  , in U  gives each legitimate agent’s payoff to membership in club i over [ , 1) nn+ , i.e.,  
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 (16) 
In words, a legitimate agent’s per-period payoff is given by the net benefits of trade, minus the 
costs associated with administering data and keeping it secure, minus the costs associated with 
identity theft by the unskilled and skilled, minus the costs of resolving data breaches. 
A symmetric steady-state allocation in this economy is an ordered pair ( , ) ds, where d 
gives the data length and s gives the skill threshold for both clubs.  In symmetric steady state, the 
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.   (17) 
                                                 
24 Equilibria studied here are “open loop” Nash equilibria (i.e., equilibria in sequences of decisions) in a dynamic 
game between clubs A and B (Başar and Olsder 1998).  By restricting the clubs to relatively simple strategies, the 
open-loop equilibrium concept allows for analytical characterization of equilibria.  These equilibria are time-
consistent in the usual sense. 19 
  A symmetric steady-state allocation ( , ) ds is incentive compatible if it satisfies the 
following conditions: 
1.  Individual rationality, i.e.,  ( , ) 0
f Vd s ≥ ; 
2.  No defection (legitimate agents in each club have an incentive to produce), i.e., 
(,)
f Vd s cX β ≥− ; 
3.  No exclusion (each club has an incentive to admit new members), i.e.,  (,)
f Vd s V ≥ , 
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− ∑ . (18) 
 
  A symmetric steady-state allocation ( *, *) ds is an equilibrium if 
1.  It is incentive compatible, and 
2.  The infinite sequence { } {} ,, 0 ( , ) ( *, *),( *, *), in in n ds d s d s
∞
= = …  represents a best response 
for each club in steady state, i.e., { } ( *, *),( *, *), ds ds …  maximizes  ,0
f
i V  for each club i, 
when club j also chooses { } {} ,, 0 ( , ) ( *, *),( *, *), jn jn n ds d sd s
∞
= = … , and both clubs have 
“initial conditions”  ,1 ,1 ( , ) ( *, *) ii ds d s −− = . 
 
The analysis below considers equilibria for two candidate distributions for Φ and Γ that 
allow for closed-form solutions.  In particular, frauds’ skill endowments s are specified to follow 
the exponential distribution  ( ) 1
s se
φ − Φ= − , and the distribution  ( ) ε Γ  of frauds’ effort costs is 
specified as a uniform distribution, normalized to  [0,1] U .  These choices can be rationalized as 20 
follows.  In the case of Φ, the set of equilibria considered will be determined by the hazard 
function  ( ) () () /1 () f ss s ′ =Φ −Φ .  The analysis below focuses on the case of a constant hazard 
rate ( ) fs φ =  , which is equivalent to assuming an exponential distribution for s.  Note that φ 
determines the incremental benefit of a small increase in data security.  In the case of Γ, a 
sufficiently “flat” distribution ( ′′ Γ  small) is necessary to ensure the intuitive property that each 
club’s optimal data length d decreases with a falling cost of maintaining such data k.  This 
requirement is clearly satisfied if Γ is uniform.
25  
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respectively, where (20) holds with equality for  , 0 in s > .  Note that the left-hand side of 
condition (19) [(20)] gives the clubs’ marginal benefit of an increase in  , in d [ , in s ] while the right-
hand side gives its marginal cost.  In symmetric steady state these conditions reduce to  
  () ( )
()
2 2 2
1( ) () ( )
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  . (22) 
                                                 
25 This specification is implicit in the model of Kahn and Roberds (2008). 21 
Thus, for this particular specification, a symmetric steady-state allocation ( , ) ds is an 
equilibrium if it is incentive compatible, and satisfies (21) and (22).  The following proposition 
may now be stated (proofs in this section are given in the Appendix): 
 
Proposition 1.  A unique symmetric steady-state equilibrium ( *, *) ds exists with  *0 s >  under 
the following conditions: 
1.  the hazard rate φ of the skill distribution is sufficiently large; 
2.  the breach cost B is less than the other costs of identity theft, i.e.,  B cL β <+; 
3.  verification costs  , , 0 Kk >    are sufficiently small; 
4.  β is sufficiently close to unity (agents are sufficiently long-lived). 
 
3.8  Comparison with the efficient allocation 
  The data record length  * d  and the skill threshold  * s  in the symmetric equilibrium 
allocation can be usefully compared to the values of d and s that would be chosen by a planner.  
The planner operates under the same informational constraints as the decentralized arrangements.  
PID must be freely surrendered and cannot be shared across groups.  A separate club is formed 
for each group, and agents have the option of joining the appropriate club.  Also, allocations 
chosen by the planner are subject to the same incentive-compatibility constraints as in the 
noncooperative allocation. 
The planner’s objective is taken as the steady-state value of legitimate agents’ club 
membership, ( , )
f Vd s .  A golden-rule allocation is a steady-state allocation ( , ) pp ds that 
maximizes the planner’s objective.  Note that a golden-rule allocation represents a constrained-
efficient allocation because the planner places no weight on either the utility of the initial 22 
generation of legitimate agents or the utility of frauds. 
First-order conditions for the planner’s problem are given by 
  ( )( )
()
22
1( ) () ( )
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 ++ ′ −Φ ≤   − 
  , (24) 
where (24) holds with equality for  0 s > .  These conditions differ from equilibrium conditions 
(21) and (22) because the planner fully internalizes the fraud-suppression benefits of setting both 
the required data length d and the skill threshold s.  The following result is shown in the 
Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2.  Under the conditions of Proposition 1, there is a unique golden-rule allocation 
(,) pp ds where  0 p s > . 
 
The next two results compare the solution to the planner’s problem to the symmetric 
steady-state equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 3.  Under the conditions of Proposition 1, 
1.  * s  and  p s  are increasing in η (skill thresholds increase as stolen data becomes more 
useful for identity theft); 
2.  As 1 η →  (stolen data becomes more useful),  * ss →< ∞  while  p s →∞, whence 
* p ss <  (the skill threshold in the symmetric equilibrium is lower than that chosen by the 
planner). 23 
 
Proposition 4.  Under the conditions of Proposition 1, 
1.  The amount of data collected by the planner,  p d , does not vary with η, while the amount 
of data collected in the symmetric equilibrium,  * d , is increasing in η  as  1 η → ; 
2.  As 1 η → ,  * d →∞, whence  * p dd >  (the planner collects less data than is collected in 
the symmetric equilibrium). 
 
Not surprisingly, rates of identity theft differ across the two allocations.  For a steady-
state allocation (,) ds, the rate of identity theft (measure of successful frauds)  (,) ds ρ  is given 
by the sum of the rate of identity theft by unskilled and skilled frauds, and can be computed as 
  ( ) 1( ) (,) ()
.
(1 ) (1 )
s ds s








Proposition 5.  Under the conditions of Proposition 1,  
1.  The rate of skilled identity theft is greater in the symmetric equilibrium than under the 
golden-rule allocation; 
2.  As 1 η → , the rate of unskilled identity theft is greater under the golden-rule allocation 
than in the symmetric equilibrium; 
3.  For  /k    bounded, as  1 η →  the total rate of identity theft is greater under the golden-rule 
allocation than in the symmetric allocation. 
 
3.9  Discussion 
  Proposition 3 establishes, under certain conditions, that when each card network 24 
independently determines the amount and security of data compiled on its members, networks 
insufficiently secure their data relative to the golden-rule allocation.  The clubs attempt to 
compensate for insufficient security by overaccumulating identifying data on their members 
(Proposition 4). 
Insufficient security is applied because each network’s cost of a data breach, B, is less 
than its social cost, cL B β ++ .  Lax security leads, in turn, to a suboptimally high rate of 
identity theft by skilled frauds (Proposition 5).  Because each network cannot control the rate of 
data theft from the other network’s database, its best response is to accumulate more PID, 
thereby suppressing the rate of unskilled identity theft, and driving the overall rate of identity 
theft below that of the efficient allocation (Proposition 5).  Despite its lower rate of identity theft, 
the equilibrium allocation is inefficient due to its higher “privacy” costs, i.e., the costs of 
assembling and maintaining the personal data necessary to keep fraud in check. 
 
4.  Attaining efficiency 
  This section discusses three means for improving on the inefficient steady-state 
equilibrium allocation:  (1) mandated limits on the amount of data collected and security levels, 
(2) reallocations of data-breach costs, and (3) data sharing through a merger of the networks. 
 
4.1 Direct regulation 
One possibility would be direct regulation of entities engaged in the collection of 
personal data, such as the clubs in the model.  The strategic interplay between the data compiled 
and its security imposes a high informational burden on this type of regulation.  In practice it 
may be difficult for policymakers to enforce standards along both of these dimensions. 25 
Consequently, this section analyzes the effects of policies that regulate data collection or data 
security, but not both. 
Suppose, for example, that a regulator observes that excessive PID is being collected, and 
decides to constrain the amount of data that each network collects, i.e., the regulator requires 
* c dd d =< .  Security levels would still be set noncooperatively:  let  c s  be the equilibrium skill 
threshold chosen by the clubs under this constraint. 













=  −   
 (26) 
which can be compared to condition (24) evaluated at the solution to the planner’s problem: 











=   −   
. (27) 
A benevolent regulator who only regulates data length would choose  c d to maximize  ( , )
f
cc Vd s  
subject to (26).  The solution to the regulator’s problem is given in the following Proposition 
(calculations are in the Appendix): 
 
Proposition 6.  A regulator who can only regulate data length chooses the same data length as its 
golden-rule value, i.e., the regulator sets  cp dd = .  Under this policy, as  1 η → , clubs choose a 
skill threshold  c s  greater than its value in the symmetric equilibrium, but less than its golden-rule 
value, i.e.,  * cp sss <<. 
 
Thus, relative to an unregulated outcome, a policy of constraining data collection 
improves welfare by (1) reducing the costs of data collection (including intangible costs) and (2) 26 
encouraging networks to increase security and therefore make skilled identity theft more 
difficult.  The potential benefit of increased security can be partly undone by two effects, 
however.  First, there is substitution into unskilled identity theft, since unskilled identity theft 
becomes both easier (less PID is required for an impersonation) and more popular, as some 
skilled frauds shift into low-tech forms of identity theft.  Second, for frauds with sufficient 
technical abilities, skilled identity theft becomes easier as it requires less PID.  Relative to the 
efficient allocation, a policy of constraining data collection does not completely correct the 
inefficient pattern observed in the unregulated equilibrium, of over-suppression of unskilled and 
under-suppression of skilled identity theft (cf. Proposition 5). 
Likewise, a regulator might require that networks increase security levels.  Consider the 
case where a regulator requires each network to implement  C ss = , but allows networks to 
privately determine the amount of data that they collect.  Let  C d  be the equilibrium amount of 
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 (29) 
A benevolent regulator who regulates only security would choose  C s to maximize 
(,)
f
CC Vds subject to (28). 27 
  Unlike the other allocations studied in this paper, ( , ) CC ds cannot be expressed in closed 
form (see the Appendix for calculations).  Numerically, ( , ) CC ds seems to closely approximate 
(,) pp ds for many parameter values (see Section 4.3 below for an example). 
 
4.2  Increasing liability for a data breach 
  An alternative regulatory approach would be to increase each network’s costs for a data 
breach so as to better align the private and social costs of a breach, i.e., raising each network’s 
breach costs to BB π ′ =+ where  0 π > .  This might occur in a number of ways.  One possibility 
would be for regulators to levy penalties in the case of a data breach.  Such penalties have been 
de facto imposed, for example, by at least 35 state legislatures through the passage of laws that 
require consumers be notified (at some cost to the data collector) when their data is subject to 
unauthorized access (Anderson et al. 2008).  This section explores another way of increasing 
breach costs, which is to increase each network’s civil legal liability for the costs resulting from 
theft of its data. 
  There are some significant practical restrictions on this type of policy.  For example, 
under U.S. law it is difficult to establish liability for identity theft because many entities have 
access to payment data, which tends to constrain the use of contractual agreements to allocate the 
risk of harm from identity theft (Schreft 2007).  Awards for damages, when they do occur, are 
limited to the economic loss resulting from a breach, rather than the larger amounts that might 
result from application of a negligence standard (Chandler (forthcoming)). 
 Translating  these  constraints  in the context of the model, an “economic loss standard” 
would limit each club’s maximum liability under a data breach to a prorated share (η) of the 
losses of the other club (cL + ) when it experiences identity theft, adjusted for present value.  28 
That is, the upper bound on penalties under an economic loss standard would be given by 
 (1 ) ( ) . EL rc L π πη =≡ + +  (30) 
Enforcing a penalty of  EL π  achieves efficiency for the special case where clubs are 
constrained to collect the efficient amount of data ( p dd = ).  To see this, note that if we replace B 
in the clubs’ first-order condition (26) with  EL BB π ′ = + , this is the same as the planner’s first-
order condition (27) so long as d is identical in both conditions.  Where data length is 
endogenous, however, an economic loss standard does not correct clubs’ incentives in data 
collection (cf. conditions (28) and (29)); hence efficiency does not obtain for the general case.  
Nonetheless, increasing liability can improve welfare: 
 
Proposition 7.  Suppose that each club’s civil liability for a data breach is given by  (0, ) EL π π ∈ , 
and let dπ  and sπ  represent each club’s equilibrium data length and skill level respectively when 
π is in force.  Then as  1 η → , 
1.  (, * ) p dd d π ∈  and  ( *, ) p ss s π ∈ ; 
2.  (,) ds π π  dominates ( *, *) ds. 
 
4.3  Numerical Example 
To better gauge the relative efficacy of the various regulatory approaches, allocations 
were computed numerically.  Table 1 below displays some typical results.  Parameter values for 
the example are: 
 
25; 1; .9;






=== =  
 29 
These parameter values allow for a moderate spillover ( .5 η = ) from one club’s data 
practices to the other’s.  The ratio ( / ) 10 k =    places a relatively high value on the privacy of 
personal information.  To facilitate comparisons, the normalizations  0 K =  and  (1 ) 1 uF F −=  are 
adopted.  Columns 1 and 2 of the Table give the numerical values of the allocation ( , ) ds in each 
case.  Column 3 gives the percentage of skilled identity thieves, i.e., the proportion of frauds who 
are able to attempt data breaches.  Column 4 gives the identity theft rate  ( , ) ds ρ  of each 
allocation.  Since uF(1-F) is normalized to one in the examples, the identity theft rates in Table 1 
do not represent gross identity theft rates, but instead represent the proportion of frauds who are 
successful at impersonation.  Column 5 gives the steady-state variable cost of identity theft for 
each allocation, including the cost of data collection and security, i.e., 
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Table 1:  Comparison of Allocations 









( ) 100* 1 ( ) s −Φ  
Identity theft 
success rate 
100* ( , ) ds ρ  
Steady-
state costs 




(,) pp ds  
5.03 2.53  0.6  20.0  10.3 
2. Symmetric 
equilibrium: 
(* ,* ) ds 
33.2 0.04  92.3  5.78  34.7 
3. Regulated data 
collection: 
(,) cc ds 
5.03 0.984  14.0  22.7  10.8 
4. Regulated 
security level: 
(,) CC ds 
(approximate) 
5.04 2.5  0.7  20.0 10.3 
5. Economic loss 
standard: ( , ) ds π π  
when  EL BB π ′ =+  
17.3 1.72  3.2  6.00  19.0 
 
  Allocations 1 and 2 illustrate the comparisons derived in Propositions 3, 4, and 5.  In 
symmetric equilibrium, the networks collect over six times as much data as in the efficient 
allocation, and the equilibrium security effort (skill threshold) is very low.  Identity theft is 
effectively suppressed in the symmetric equilibrium, but the welfare cost of this suppression is 
high since so much data is collected. 
  Of the three regulatory policies, regulation in security levels (i.e., skill levels, allocation 
4) is the most effective, virtually replicating the efficient allocation for this example.  This policy 
is successful because it eliminates over 99 percent of skilled identity theft.  Data length  C d  is 
essentially set as in the planner’s allocation, at a level that balances the costs of data collection 31 
against the benefits of reductions in unskilled identity theft.  Somewhat less obviously, a policy 
of limiting data collection (allocation 3) does nearly as well, since placing limits on PID 
collected also improves clubs’ security incentives.  The least effective policy is the 
implementation of an economic loss standard (allocation 5).  While this policy improves welfare, 
it does not fully eliminate clubs’ incentives to inefficiently substitute data collection for data 
security. 
 
4.4  Variable network size 
  An alternative method for controlling data breaches is to allow for the sharing of data 
residing in the databases of the two separate clubs (networks).  In the model, sharing data across 
clubs eliminates the incentive for data breaches because any stolen identifying information 
duplicates existing information and is automatically revealed as fraudulent.  Exchanging data 
across clubs can thus be beneficial even though agents in each club never interact in commerce 
with agents of the other group. 
In principle, data sharing could be implemented in a number of ways.  LoPucki (2001) 
proposes the creation of a governmental agency that would manage a consolidated database of 
PID.  Inclusion in the database would be optional.  This section considers an alternative channel 
for data sharing, which is the voluntary preference of agents in the two groups to share data 
across groups.  This is done by a slight generalization in the environment studied in Section 3. 
In this generalized environment, agents have the option of transacting through a single 
club or dual clubs (one for each group of agents).  If agents decide to form a single club, no data 
breaches can occur in equilibrium, so the club simply compiles data of length d on all its 32 
members
26 to maximize the average per-capita net benefit of legitimate club membership.  That 
is, the single club chooses d to maximize (cf. expression (16)) 
1
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 (32) 
where the underlines indicate average values, i.e.,  AA BB uu u µ µ = +  etc.  Let  s d  denote the 
choice of data length that maximizes (32), and let  , As V  ( , Bs V ) denote the steady-state value of 
legitimate club membership for agents of group  A G ( B G ) when PID of length  s d  is collected.  A 
steady-state equilibrium with a single club exists when the following incentive constraints are 
satisfied 
1.  Individual rationality,  , 0f o r  , is A B Vi G G ≥=; 
2.  No defection, , for , is i A B Vc Xi G G β ≥− = ; 
3.  No exclusion,  , , i is A B VV f o r i G G ≥= , where  i V  is the value of maintaining the club 
without admitting new members, analogous to (18). 
  If, as in Section 3, agents’ preferences are symmetric across groups, it is immediate that 
an equilibrium with a single club exists whenever a symmetric steady-state equilibrium exists.  
Moreover, the equilibrium with the single-club equilibrium dominates the equilibrium with dual 
clubs.  For any value of d chosen by the dual clubs, the single club can do better with this same 
data because the single club’s database provides a greater benefit in terms of fraud reduction (all 
frauds must now attempt the more costly unskilled identity theft) at a lower cost (since the single 
club incurs no costs of securing data against breaches and no breach costs). 
                                                 
26 Recall that an agent’s group is private information, so the club cannot require different amounts of data from 
agents of different groups.  Note also that the information provided by the court does not allow for separation of 
agents by groups ex post. 33 
In the absence of unanimity, however, conflicts of interest can arise as to the amount of 
data the single club should compile and retain.  Sufficient heterogeneity in preferences can limit 
potential efficiency gains achievable through voluntary consolidation of data.  To demonstrate 
this point, consider the following parameterization of the model.  Suppose that the per-unit 
physical cost of compiling and storing data is negligible, so that the cost parameter k reflects 
only intangible costs associated with the loss of privacy.  Agents in the two groups  A G  and  B G  
have identical preferences, except that agents in group  A G  are essentially indifferent to the 
privacy of their stored personal data ( A k ε = , where  0 ε >  is arbitrarily small), while agents in 
group  B G  place a higher value on confidentiality ( BA kk > ).  The two groups are of unequal size:  
group  A G  has unit measure as before, while group  B G  has measure  (0,1) B µ µ = ∈ . 
Suppose that agents in the two groups decide to form a single club.  The optimal data 
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and the equilibrium per-capita net benefit of club membership for an agent of group i is 
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, (34) 
for , AB iGG = . 
  Now suppose each group decides to form its own club.  In this case, agents in group A are 
willing to surrender virtually limitless amounts of personal information to club  A G , which 
effectively precludes the possibility of fraudulent entry into their club.  Once assembled, 
however, club  A G ’s database is subject to data breaches committed by skilled frauds seeking 34 
access to club  B G .  Thus, with dual clubs, club  A G  chooses  A d →∞ as  0 A k →  and chooses  A s  
to maximize 
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For sufficiently large φ, the optimal skill threshold for club  A G  will be given by  
  ( )
1ln ( )/ A sF B φµ β φ
− =   , (36) 
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. (37) 
  Because the PID stored in club A’s database is so extensive, club  B G  cannot control its 
rate of skilled identity theft:  any amount of data  B d  that club  B G might require for entry can be 
stolen from club  A G  with sufficient skill.  Knowing this, club  B G  chooses a data length  B d  that 
balances the benefits of reduced unskilled identity fraud against the costs associated with the loss 
of privacy.  This data does not need to be well secured because data stolen from club  B G ’s 
database is insufficient to gain access to club  A G ; that is, there are no breach costs for club  B G.   
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From (36) and (39), the equilibrium per-capita net benefit of membership in club  B G  in the case 
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For this parameterization, the comparison between the single club and dual clubs is stated as 
 
Proposition 8.  Suppose that groups  A G  and  B G  have heterogeneous preferences over the 
privacy of stored data ( ba kk >  arbitrarily small) and that the measure of each group is 
10 AB µ µ => >.  Then for φ sufficiently large and  , , , 0 BB Kk µ >    sufficiently small, 
1.  A steady-state equilibrium exists for both the single club and dual clubs; 
2.  Legitimate agents in both groups are better off under dual clubs than under the single 
club. 
 
Proof.  The proof of Part 1 follows that of Propositions 1 and 2.  To show Part 2, let  / 0 φ →   .  
Then, comparing (34) and (37), 
*
,, Ad As VV >  for  0 B µ >  sufficiently small.  Comparing (34) and 
(40), 
*
,, Bd Bs VV >  under the same conditions. 
 
  Intuitively, Proposition 3 says that, given sufficient heterogeneity, agents may prefer to 
tolerate a certain amount of data theft, as occurs under dual clubs, rather than attempt to 36 
eliminate the problem entirely by forming a single club.  Agents who place little value on 
privacy allow their club to compile large amounts of personal data, since this deters fraud, even 
though this data is subject to occasional breaches and misuse.  By contrast, agents who place a 
higher value on privacy will tolerate a higher rate of identity theft, including theft that arises 
through data breaches, as the cost of keeping more of their PID private.  Merging the two clubs 
can result in a level of personal data collection that seems excessive to the high-privacy group 
but insufficient to the low-privacy group. 
  More generally, Proposition 8 illustrates how heterogeneity can limit the efficiency gains 
from consolidation of PID.  So long as this information is shared through voluntary associations 
(rather than mandatory participation in a single arrangement), disparate groups of agents in an 
economy may prefer to sort into separate alliances with differing levels of personal privacy and 
data security.  Clearly, heterogeneity can also limit efficiency gains attainable through other 
means as well.  Regulatory limits on data collected, for example, might constrain efficiency for 
groups with little taste for privacy. 
 
5.  Relationship to the Literature 
The above analysis builds on well-known models of exchange in search-theoretic 
environments.  Numerous papers in this literature allow for the possibility of fraudulent 
transactions, both through counterfeit currency (Green and Weber (1996), Kultti (1996), Monnet 
(2005), Williamson (2002), Nosal and Wallace (2007), Cavalcanti and Nosal (2007)) and 
through various types of fraud in credit-based payments (Camera and Li (2003), Kahn et al. 
(2005), Kahn and Roberds (2008)).  What is new here is the consideration of a new, empirically 
significant, type of transactions fraud stemming from the theft of identifying data. 37 
  The framework presented also shares features with some papers in the literature on the 
economics of information security (surveyed in Anderson and Moore (2006)).  Varian (2004) 
presents a game-theoretic model in which “system reliability” (here, corresponding roughly to 
deterrence of identity theft) is modeled as a public good produced by the interaction between 
individual efforts at reliability provision (corresponding to PID collection and storage).  The 
Varian model is extended by Grossklags et al. (2008) to allow for individual insurance against 
system failures. 
The environment above is similar to these models, in the sense that knowledge of PID 
functions as a nonrival good within each group of agents, supplying a club-wide level of 
deterrence against identity theft.  Here, in the initial model, unanimity within groups ensures that 
public-goods problems do not arise.  Instead the focus is on potential negative spillovers across 
groups:  provision of the same good (data) that suppresses identity theft for one club increases 
the likelihood of identity theft for the other.  Efficient management of personal data therefore 
involves a balance between its positive (within-club) and negative (cross-club) effects.  Public-
goods problems can quickly reappear, however, with the introduction of even a modest amount 
of heterogeneity, as is illustrated in Section 4.4. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
  This paper has presented a formal model in which identity theft arises endogenously and 
the concept of an efficient degree of confidentiality for personal identifying information (PID) 
has meaning.  An allocation provides efficient confidentiality if the amount of PID shared for 
identity verification and the security of that data allow groups of agents to engage in beneficial 
transactions at minimal cost.  In noncooperative settings, inefficiencies can arise due to 38 
spillovers from one group of agents’ decisions along these dimensions to another’s.  
Interventions such as direct regulation of security practices can increase efficiency, but the 
multidimensional nature of the security problem means that attaining full efficiency may be 
problematic.  Sharing data across groups also can improve efficiency, but heterogeneity in 
preferences may limit welfare gains attainable through this channel. 
  These results have been developed in the context of a particular methodology, one that 
abstracts from many of the complexities of modern institutions.  However, the basic idea behind 
this approach—that the exchange of PID, despite its risks and costs, can enable otherwise 
infeasible intertemporal exchanges of goods—can be generalized and should provide impetus for 
further research. 39 
Appendix:  Proofs. 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
The proof proceeds in three steps.  First, we show that any solution ( , ) ds to conditions 
(21) and (22) at equality represents a locally optimal and unique response by each club when the 
other club plays { } (,) ds .  Second, we first show that under the hypotheses of the Proposition, 
there is only one such solution (* ,* ) ds, so that this solution satisfies the second requirement for 
an equilibrium.  Third, we verify that (* ,* ) ds is incentive compatible. 
Step 1.  In an open-loop Nash equilibrium, at each discrete date n, each club i maximizes 
its objective  ,
f
in V { } ,, (,) in in ds  by choosing a strategy { } ,, 0 (,) in m in m m ds C
∞
++ = ∈ , taking the strategy of 
the other club { } ,, 0 (,) jn m jn m m ds
∞
++ =  as given.  Each club’s strategy space C is the product space 
{ } () () . . . DS DS ×××× , where D and S are the set of feasible choices for d and s at each discrete 
time period.  To guarantee that this problem is well-defined take  (,) Dd d =  and  (,) Ss s =  for 
“small”  ,0 ds >  and “large”  , ds <∞. 
In general, necessary conditions for an interior optimum for club i’s problem are given by 
functional (i.e., difference) equations (19) and (20) at equality (e.g., Luenberger (1969), chapter 
7).  But in symmetric steady state, each club i knows that the other club will play a time-invariant 
strategy, which implies, from (19) and (20), that club i’s best response will also be time 
invariant.  Club i’s optimization problem can therefore be reduced to the following ordinary 
calculus problem:  choose ( , ) ii ds to minimize club i’s steady-state cost of identity theft, given 




(1 ) (1 )

















++ Φ ++ − Φ +    −  
 −
+− Φ   − 
 
 (41) 






(1 ) (1 )
() ( ) 1 () ( )
()
(1 )
















−Φ + − − Φ +    −  
 −
+− Φ =   − 
 (42) 
 











   (43) 
which correspond to (21) and (22) when  ij dd = .  Second-order conditions are given by 
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33
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−− −        
 (46) 
Conditions (44) and (45) are readily seen to hold when ( , ) ( , ) ii j j ds ds = .  Sufficient conditions 
for (46) to hold are symmetry and  2( ) B cL β < + , which is implied by  B cL β <+. 
Step 2.  Under the assumption of a constant hazard rate for Φ, rewrite (22) at equality as 
  ( )
()
(1 ) 1 ( )
() .
1








Substituting (47) into (21) and rearranging gives the following quadratic equation 41 
 
2
01 2 () ( 1 ) 0 Qz A z A z Az ≡− + += , (48) 
where 1 ( ) zs =− Φ  and  
  0 Ac L = + , (49) 
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. (51) 
From the above,  0 (0) 0 QA = >  and  12 (1) 0 QA A = +<  for φ sufficiently large.   ( ) Qz therefore 
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  (52) 
Now define 
  ( ) ()
11 (* ,* ) ( 1 * ), ( 1 * ) ds D z z
−− =Φ − Φ −. (53) 
By construction, ( *, *) ds satisfies (21) and (22), and  *0 s > . 
  Step 3. To show incentive compatibility, suppose initially that  0 F = , so that 
f VV =  
where V is given in (4).  Then the individual-rationality, no-defection, and no-exclusion 
conditions are clearly satisfied with strict inequality for β sufficiently close to unity.  Now, for 
0 F > , let  , , Kk and  approach zero; more specifically let  (,, ) Kk θ <    where  0 θ >  and  i  
is the sup norm. Then it can be shown that as  0 θ → ,  * d  and  * s  as defined in (53) are bounded 
by 
1/2 θ
−  and  lnθ − , respectively.  This, in turn, implies that  ( *, *)
f Vds V →  as  0 θ → , as fraud 42 
rates and all costs of fraud deterrence are driven to zero.  Hence, by continuity, incentive 
compatibility must hold for  , , Kk and   all positive and sufficiently small. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Begin by solving for ( , ) pp ds.  Rewrite (24) at equality as 
  () ( )
()
(1 ) ( ) ( )(1 ) 1 ( )
() .
1








Substituting (54) into (23) and rearranging gives the following quadratic equation 
 
2
01 2 () ( 1 ) 0 Qz A z A z Az ≡− + + = , (55) 
where 1 ( ) zs =− Φ  and  
  0 Ac L = + , (56) 
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. (58) 
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1,  () Qz has a unique root  p z  in (0,1) for φ sufficiently 
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The golden-rule allocation is then given as  ( ) ( )
11 ( , ) ( 1) ,( 1) pp p p ds D z z
−− =Φ − Φ −. 
Second-order conditions for the planner’s problem are given by 43 
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which can be shown to hold for all positive d and s and hence for ( , ) pp ds. 
Incentive compatibility of ( , ) pp ds follows from the same arguments as given in the proof 
of Proposition 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Part 1.  From (52) and (59), both  * z  and  p z  are clearly decreasing in η, so skill 
thresholds  * s  and  p s  must be increasing in η. 
























Hence, as  1 η → , 
1 *( 1 ) ss z
− →= Φ −  while  p s  diverges. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 44 
To compare  p d  and  * d , first invert  ( ) Ds in (47) and substitute into first-order condition 
(21) to obtain the following condition in d: 
 
2
01 2 () 0 Rd R R d Rd = ++ = , (64) 
where 











 +− −− +
=  − 
  , (66) 
  2 . R k = −  (67) 
Similarly, invert  () Ds in (54) and substitute into the planner’s first-order condition, (23), 
to obtain the condition 
 
2
01 2 () 0 Rd R R d Rd = ++ = , (68) 
where  00 R R = ,  22 R R = , and 





Evidently,  * d  and  p d  may be expressed as (positive) roots of  ( ) R d  and  () R d , respectively.  In 
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     (72) 
as 1 η → , which is increasing in η for cL B β + > . 
  Part 2.  From (72), d →∞    as  1 η → , whence  * d  also diverges. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
(The calculations in this section simplify notation by setting  (1 ) 1 uF F − = .) 
Part 1.  From first-order condition (22), the rate of skilled identity theft in the symmetric 
equilibrium is 
  () 1( * )
(* )
s




   
. (73) 















Comparing (73) and (74), skilled identity theft must be lower under the golden-rule allocation. 
  Part 2.  The rate of unskilled identity theft in the symmetric equilibrium is given by 
(* ) / * sd Φ .  From the Propositions 3 and 4,  (* ) () 0 ss Φ →Φ >  and  * d →∞ as  1 η → , implying 
that unskilled identity theft is driven to zero as  1 η → . 46 
The rate of unskilled identity theft under the golden-rule allocation is given by 
() / pp sd Φ .  From the proof of Proposition 2,  ( ) 1 p s Φ →  as  1 η →  but  p d  is positive and does 
not depend on η.  Hence the rate of unskilled identity theft converges to 1/ 0 p d >  as  1 η → . 
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which must hold for  /k    bounded and  , 0 k >    sufficiently small. 
 
Calculations for Section 4: 
  (Again we simplify notation by setting  (1 ) 1 uF F − = .) 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
A regulator who can only determine data length sets d to maximize  ( , )
f Vd s  subject to 
the clubs’ first-order condition in s, which in symmetric equilibrium is given by (22) or 
equivalently (26).  Using (22) we can eliminate s and simplify the regulator’s problem to the 
following: choose d to minimize the steady-state fraud costs, i.e., choose  c d  to maximize 





=− + − +<
 
, (77) 
which has solution  cp dd = . 47 
Evaluating (26) at  cp dd =  and comparing to (27), it follows that  cp ss < .  From (26) and 
the fact that  * p dd <  (Proposition 4), it follows that  * c ss > . 
 
Derivation of the Regulator’s Problem When the Regulator Only Sets Skill Thresholds 
  Again let  1( ) zs =− Φ .  The problem of a regulator who only chooses s is equivalent to 
the following:  minimize steady-state fraud costs over  (0,1) z∈  
  ,
() ( 1 ) ( )
ln
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 (79) 
This regulator’s problem may be compared to the planner’s problem, which is equivalent to 
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This contrasts with the planner’s problem, which, substituting (80) into (78), simplifies to the 
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 (83) 
which after some manipulation can be written as 
() ( ) () ()
32 2
2
() ( 2 ) ()
() () () .
12 ( 1 )
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zG z z G zP z
ηη β η ηβ
ηφ η
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 (84) 
Squaring both sides of (84) to eliminate radicals, a solution to the regulator’s problem requires 
finding the roots of a fifth degree polynomial, a problem for which there is no general analytical 
solution. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 
  Part 1.  For  EL π π <  and η sufficiently close to one, dπ  is given by (70) where 
BB π ′ =+ replaces B, and sπ  is given by 
1ln φ
− − [RHS (52)], where again B′ replaces B.  Under 
these conditions, dπ  and sπ  are differentiable functions, with  0 dπ′ <  and  0 sπ′ > , hence 
* dd π <  and  * ss π > .  Retracing the steps in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4, it can then be 
shown that  p dd π >  and  p ss π <  as  1 η → . 
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 , 
where dπ  and sπ  are the functions derived in Part 1.  From the Chain Rule, 
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   (87) 
 
(cf. conditions (23) and (24)).  In equilibrium, dπ  and sπ  must satisfy first-order conditions (21) 
and (22) where B is replaced with B′, from which it follows that 







for ( , ) ( , ) ds d s π π = , so long as  EL π π <  and η is sufficiently close to one.  Since  0 dπ′ <  and 
0 sπ′ > , it follows that  ( ) 0 V π ′ > . 50 
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